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THE PROPOSED "SCIENCE COURT"
James A. Martin*
Serious attention has been paid in the past two years to the proposal to establish a "science court" to assist public policymakers on
important issues involving scientific or technological matters. 1 The
common thread among the many models suggested by proponents
of the idea is a mechanism whereby the factual, scientific components of important public questions can be separated from policy
considerations and evaluated by judges who are both scientifically
competent and neutral. The choice of the phrase "science court"
is probably· unfortunate insofar as it implies many things that we
traditionally associate with courts: strict rules of evidence, finality
of judgments, and the like. Yet the phrase does accurately reflect
a central belief of the science court's proponents-that the adversarial process, which is central to the trial process in the commonlaw system, holds promise for supplying provisional answers to scientific questions that must be answered before policy may be set.
Even at the outset, however, it should be noted that the contribution
of a science court would not be-and could not be-final answers
to scientific questions, but rather would be a conclusion reached by
a reliable procedure that we have done all we can reasonably do for
the present to produce the best possible provisional answer for a
policy question that needs immediate action.
This article discusses the desirability of establishing some kind
of science court. Section I examines arguments in favor of the creation of a science court. Section II compares the truth-seeking devices
of the scientific method and the legal system in order to assess their
merits in assisting the public policymakers faced with issues involving
scientific matters. Section III discusses the various models that have
been proposed for a science court. Section IV concentrates on the
model proposed by Dr. Arthur Kantrowitz, taking it as the preferred
model, and defends it against some criticism while suggesting various
refinements. Section V examines the potential dangers of such an
adjudicatory device to see whether or not they can be overcome.

* Professor of Law, The University of Michigan. B.S. 1965, University of Illinois; M.S. (mathematics) 1966, J.D. 1969, The University of Michigan.
1. See Boffey, Experiment Planned To Test Feasibility of a "Science Court," 193
ScJENCE 129 (1976).
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Section VI supplies an imagined case history of a case submitted to
a science court in order to illustrate the concepts discussed in the
article. Finally, section VII examines the weaknesses of the proposal and ponders the underlying question, is it worth it?
For purposes of more critical evaluation by the reader, I will state
at the outset that in studying the matter my doubts about the science
court proposal have shifted from concern over procedural difficulties,
which I believe are soluble, and potential abuses, which I think can
be avoided, to the final question posed above: whether the effort
is justified by the results.

I.

REASONS FOR CREATING A SCIENCE COURT

Four main reasons have been advanced for devising some
means, such as the science court, for answering scientific2 questions
involved in public policy issues. The first and most obvious is the
need for accurate information to serve as a basis for deciding basic
policy questions. Will freon damage the upper atmosphere and
thereby increase the incidence of skin cancer, or will it lower the
oxygen level of the atmosphere? Is saccharin a dangerous food additive? How dangerous are breeder reactors? Few of us, in analyzing
such issues, place much confidence in the claims of interested parties
or their representatives, even if those representatives happen to be
scientists. In fact, many recent scientific policy issues involve competing claims of scientists, which leaves nonscientific policymakers
the task of choosing among scientific claims.
A second expressed goal for an institution for settling scientific
issues is to limit the power exercised by scientists. The idea here
is that, absent a mechanism to deal separately with the scientific issues, policymakers are inclined to ask the scientists for policy recommendations, not simply for scientific facts. Thus the social views of
scientists, the soundness of which may not be particularly related to
their scientific learning, may be imposed under the guise of scientific
expertise. That tendency is all the less acceptable when it is not
made clear that policy questions are in fact being passed upon by
such experts. For example, a scientist appearing at a 'congressional
hearing might be asked whether or not breeder reactors present
"acceptable risks." The scientist's expertise mayi enable him or
her to estimate risks, and perhaps constant thought about the
problem has resulted in a more refined appreciation for the policies
2. "Scientific" is used here to exclude the so-called "soft sciences" because of the
difficulty in reaching objective answers in such fields.
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involved, but clearly the favorable presumption that ought to attach
to the scientist's informed evaluations of the scientific issues should
not extend to the scientist's opinion as to whether a predicted risk
is acceptable. The problem is aggravated when all, or at least most,
of the scientists in a particular field owe their livelihood (or political
allegiance) to one policy or another. Thus a researcher in hydrogen
fusion may have nonscientific as well as scientific reasons for favoring massive funding for research in that area, while advocates of organic gardening may reflect more than scientific interests in their
opinions on the correct policy concerning fertilizers or food additives.
A third stated reason for a science court is to eliminate the opportunity for policymakers to hide policy decisions behind scientific
conclusions. For example, whatever might be the merits of continuing the present penalties for the use of marijuana, legislators ought
not to be able to justify their position on this issue by pointing to the
now-discredited notion that marijuana is physically addictive.
Finally, some supporters of the science court idea have argued
that discredited claims should be identified, especially when they
arise in the course of public debate. In other words, when propaganda on an issue is abundant, those trying to collect data may be
confounded by claims that are made in one place (such as one publication) and refuted only in another. The refutation may be conclusive, but it does not enlighten public opinion unless the two
views are compared and evaluated. As one commentator put it, "A
major problem is that sometimes concerned industries hire public relations firms who bombard newspaper science writers and others with
distracting side issues, distortions, and half-truths. By a mass action
effect, these slanted statements dominate the public's perception of
the situation and keep some subjects 'controversial' long after scientific conclusions about them have been reached." 3 In a sense this
motivation for a science court differs only in degree from the first
listed above, since it focuses on the ability of an institution like a
science court to dispose of "easy" issues, even if it will not always
be successful with the difficult ones.
An example of the kind of issue that proponents of the science
court would put to it is one mentioned above, the effect of
chlorofluorocarbons on the ionosphere--the so-called freon issue.
Several years ago it was suggested that freon destroys ozone in the
upper atmosphere, and that sufficient amounts of freon are being
3. Harold S. Johnston, letter to editor, 191
ted).
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released into the atmosphere from such things as aerosol sprays and
refrigeration units to cause significant reduction in the amount of
ozone in the upper atmosphere. Such a depletion would increase
the amount of ultraviolet light reaching the earth's surface and thus
probably increase the incidence of human skin cancer. It might also
adversely affect various algae that supply a major part of the earth's
free oxygen.
The freon case is a good example of the kind of issue science
court proponents would like to see submitted to the court because,
almost immediately after the initial suggestion of harm to the atmosphere from freon, industry representatives came forward with claims
that the danger was not nearly so great as suggested. The fact that
the original researchers have studied the matter further and, with
others, have modified some of the earlier predictions has not
eliminated the disagreement. Some limitations on the use of freon
are being implemented at the federal level, and there are currently
proposals in some state legislatures to ban the use of the chemical.
The freon controversy also serves to illustrate the difficult
problems that often confront policymakers who must determine both
scientific facts and public policy. If the worst fears of the original
researchers are realized, there could be thousands of extra cases of
skin cancer per year, and the oxygen level of the atmosphere could
drop. Juxtaposed against these highly speculative dangers (that will
occur only if a long chain of events takes place as tentatively predicted) is the loss of a useful product, harm to an industry, and the
loss of many of the jobs that it provides. 4
Opposition to the idea of a science court stems mainly from two
concerns: that the attempt to isolate scientific issues from political
issues will prove to be impossible, and that by making pronouncements on controversial scientific matters the science court would
stifle further consideration, debate, and research on the matter. Expressions of the degree of the danger posed by such a court have
ranged from statements of mild distrust to reminders of the medieval
Church's attempt to stifle Galileo. These and other problems will
be considered below.
4. The difficulty is not resolved by invoking the principle that one should err on
the side of caution when lives may be lost, since that principle merely amounts to
advice to give greater weight to factors on one side of the question than to those
on the other, and the problem is that one cannot give greater weight to any given
factors until there is some idea of how much weight, if any, they deserve in the first
place. For example, one does not stay at home all day every day just because of
the •possibility that one could get run over crossing the street, and yet one should
err on the side of the protection of life.
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In order to understand why scientists and policymakers might be
tempted to turn to the legal model represented by a science court,
rather than relying on the traditional "scientific method," for the
resolution of controversial scientific issues, and to understand why
others might oppose it, it is appropriate to start with a comparison
of the legal method and the scientific method.
II.

A

COMPARISON OF THE LEGAL AND
SCIENTIFIC METHODS

Both the sciences and the law have developed procedures for the
determination of truth. The first step in the scientific method is the
formulation of a hypothesis, or tentative theory. 6 The second step
is to make predictions suggested by the theory (and, to be useful,
not also suggested by whatever competing theories there may be on
the subject). Thus Newton could predict, on the basis of his theory,
that the planets would follow certain paths. Finally, observations are
made to see whether they comport with predictions based on the
theory. If they do, the theory is tentatively confirmed (but only tentatively-after all, other theories might also comport with the particular observations made); if they do not, the theory is disproved. 0
Contrast the legal truth-finding method. First, the nature of the
particular truth in question is different-the court looks for particular
facts to which the law is to be applied, while the scientific method
seeks to establish "laws" or general truths. Second, the legal method
assigns specific roles to different persons in the trial process. It requires at least two advocates, a referee, and a finder of fact. In
particular, this process places great emphasis upon the role of
adversaries in the truth-finding function. The scientific method, by
contrast, assigns no formal role to any person and requires no division
of labor among its participants (though, to increase reliability, the
process of testing a theory by comparing its predictions to observations is undertaken not only by the original proponent of the theory
but by others as well).
5. Observations may suggest a theory, as Newton's apple is said to have jarred
him into conceiving his universal law of gravitation, but the connection between such
initial observations and the hypothesis is a psychological, not a deductive or logical,
link. The fact that an apple is attracted to the earth does not logically imply that
the moon is similarly attracted to the earth, but the falling apple may have suggested
that hypothesis to Newton.
6. In practice, even though a theory is formally disproved, it may require only
a small amount of tinkering to bring it into line with the disproving observation.
But until the tinkering is accomplished, the theory is disproved, and ad hoc tinkering
is generally not useful. Any theory that says "X will happen" can avoid being disproved when X doesn't happen by adding the ad hoc qualifier, "except this time."
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Third, the legal method sometimes consciously sacrifices its
truth-seeking goal to other values, such as efficiency (as seen from
some procedural rules) and competing social values (as seen in evidentiary privileges, for example), while the scientific method makes
no such institutionalized concessions to competing values. Fourth,
the legal method has a means of resolving factual disputes in the
presence of uncertainty or ignorance: the party having the burden
of proof loses when it fails to persuade the trier of fact. In contrast,
the scientific method simply defers decisions for which information
is inadequate. Another way of expressing this distinction is to say
that the legal method produces final adjudications of fact, while the
scientific method is often incapable of doing so. AB noted above,
the scientific method simply withholds judgment when data are insufficient, but the legal system invokes presumptions. Moreover, since
the nature of the testing under the scientific method is such that
theories may be disproved, but cannot be finally proved, there is a
second impediment to finality under the factfinding process. And,
of course, even scientific theories which are well established have
occasionally been later rejected, while the facts in Shelly's Case are
unlikely to be redetermined.
For the purposes of the policymakers, the degree of finality
accorded by the legal and scientific methods may be the most critical
distinction between the two processes. The acquisition of scientific
knowledge operates under no deadlines per se, while the final determination of facts ( and attendant legal rights) is of utmost importance to the legal process. The legal system, in fact, has responded
not only by limiting the time for the initial determination of facts,
but also by the rules of res judicata and collateral estoppel, which
preserve even erroneous determinations of fact for the sake of
finality.
The need for finality in the advice given to policymakers on
scientific issues lies somewhere between the extremes of the legal
and scientific methods. The total absence of finality in the scientific
method-the ability simply to wait for a conclusion-is clearly inappropriate for advising policymakers on scientific issues. Some decisions need to be made quickly. For example, given limited money
and future energy needs, massive funding of energy research may
require choices among (to name a few) fusion power, solar power,
and coal gasification. On the other hand, the strict-finality approach
of the legal system is also clearly inappropriate to policy decisionmaking. If some scientific advisory group sought out by Congress
or the President were to conclude that fusion power held little
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promise of practicality before the year 2000, it would be foolish
to persist blindly in a policy based upon that advice if a subsequent,
unexpected scientific breakthrough in fusion power were to occur.
What seems to be needed is a hybrid of the two methods that
combines the virtues of the legal method in producing final answers
to problems with the reluctance of the scientific method to make any
"final" answers too final. In particular, the use of adversaries has
great promise in bringing issues quickly to a head. Nothing in the
scientific method guarantees that hypotheses will be tested or when
they will be tested, while the adversary process usually guarantees
that all points of an opposing position will be raised and decided
within the time limits of the litigation. Moreover, the adversary process, by using the bias of interested parties to reveal the errors in their
opponents' positions, tends to correct a problem that is dealt with far
more haphazardly by the scientific method.
On the other hand, presumptions and burdens of proof should
play no part in the deliberations of any advisers to policymakers.
Such devices represent policy decisions in the legal system that, in
the absence of all the necessary information, cases should be resolved
in a certain way (e.g., against the party bearing the burden of proof).
The whole point of the science court proposal is to separate scientific
from policy issues, allocating the scientific questions to experts on
science and the policy questions to those public representatives
charged with making informed policy. Similarly, the science court
must not adopt the rigidity of res judicata and collateral estoppel
found in the legal model, although some kind of finality must be
maintained so that policy decisions can in fact be made.

ill.

VARIOUS APPROACHES

A.

The Kantrowitz Model

Several models, each varying in format and degree of specificity,
have been proposed for a "science court." The person chiefly responsible for current interest in the subject is Dr. Arthur Kantrowitz,
Chairman of Avco Everett Research Laboratory. He has proposed7
a science court with three major characteristics. First, the science
court would be a body to pass on scientific aspects of public policy
questions presented to it, carefully avoiding "political and moral"
issues which may be closely connected with the scientific issues. Second, the science court should have both advocates and judges. The
advocates should be drawn from among scientists working in the
7. Kantrowitz, Controlling Technology Democraticall>1, 1975 AMERICAN ScI505.
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field in which the controversy arises, since they are the most knowledgeable about the subject in question and best able to criticize opposing viewpoints. Science court judges, on the other hand, should
be people who "understand the rules of scientific evidence, have no
intellectual or other commitments regarding matters before them,
and possess the mature judgment needed to weigh the evidence presented. "8 They should not be from the specific area in which the
controversy arises, since bias or the appearance of bias would be hard
to avoid under such circumstances, but presumably they should be
from allied fields to assure that they are capable of understanding
the arguments presented. Judges in the Kantrowitz model would
be chosen from a panel by the advocates for each side, with a "right
to challenge judges for evidence of prejudice." 9 Third, findings
should be published, subject to national security restrictions. Publication would extend the benefit of the factfinding process to the entire scientific and political community and perhaps lend prestige to
the position of science court judge, thus helping to attract qualified
personnel. Presumably the publication of conclusions would also
serve a function similar to that of the publication of legal opinions,
which provide an additional incentive toward accuracy and create the
opportunity for criticism of the conclusions by knowledgeable persons.10
B.

Some Competing Models

Unstated by Kantrowitz, but more or less implied in his scheme,
is the notion that the science court would be in some way a permanent institution. Although panels would change, the framework
would remain available, and presumably a body of procedural rules,
customs, and the like would arise. None of that is necessary, however, to his central idea, and others have proposed a more evanescent
model in which no ongoing institutional structure exists; rather,
panels simply would be convened when needed and dissolved after
their final report. 11 The virtues of a permanent institution include
the ability to preserve the benefits of experience (as judges, for
8. Id. at 507.
9. Id.
10. Encouraging criticism reduces presumptive finality, of course, but that should
not really be a problem. By way of analogy, criticism of United States Supreme
Court opinions in the law reviews has rarely been perceived as harmful because it
detracts from the finality of a particular holding.
11. See, e.g., Science Court: High Officials Back Test of Controversial Concept,
194 SclENCE 167 (1976).
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example, are supposed to improve with experience), while the virtues of the "one-shot" model include the avoidance of the calcification that sometimes accompanies institutionalization.
A more dramatically different suggestion has been made in a
thoughtful article by Barry Casper of the Department of Physics of
Carleton College. 12 Casper argues that the advantages of the science
court idea flow mainly from the adversary part of the process and
that the chief difficulty with current legal decisionmaking processes
is that the two sides very often simply argue past each other,
emphasizing different matters and failing to answer each other's
arguments in a structured way. He also claims that in most cases
the scientific issues are not really in dispute, but that, because of
the tendency just noted, the different sides simply emphasize or ignore different issues. He concludes from these observations that,
while the common-law judge's role is unnecessary for a science court,
the adversaries' functions (chiefly in assuring by cross-examination
that all issues will in fact be considered) are necessary for the proper
resolution of scientific questions. Casper would have the adversaries
face each other before congressional committees and in debates on
public television. Members of Congress and television viewers could
then make up their own minds as to the scientific and policy questions at hand. Since the Casper model assumes that most diputes
arise because the adversaries emphasize different facts, rather than
because the parties disagree over scientific issues, and that the opportunity to cross-examine will expose the relevance of facts ignored
by the various sides to the dispute, it follows that under his model
scientific expertise will not be needed to resolve any of the scientific
issues.

C.

Current Models

We do, of course, "muddle through" at present by using various
means of attempting to resolve scientific facts underlying other disputes. One of them is the method used by congressional committees
and subcommittees: the use of expert witnesses, usually making prepared statements, who are subject to some examination by the
members and staff of the committees. The difficulty with this approach, as Casper points out, is that the adversaries themselves do
not have the opportunity for cross-examination, and the committee
members, who are seeking to alleviate their ignorance on the topic
of the testimony, do not have the necessary expertise to cross12. Casper, Technology Policy and Democracy, 194 ScIENcE 29 (1976).
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examine. Furthermore, the Executive, at least under the Ford
Administration, has shown a great reluctance to subject administration experts to cross-examination by opposing experts in front of a
committee of Congress. 13 As a political matter, that reluctance is
understandable, since the confrontation might weaken the Executive
vis-a-vis the Congress.
A second method we currently use to ascertain scientific facts
is the presentation of expert testimony in judicial trials. This method
avoids the chief problem with the congressional hearing model-lack
of cross-examination-which is the reason that Kantrowitz chose this
process as the starting point for his suggestion. At present, of
course, the method is not used for the "big issues," but rather is
limited to individual judicial disputes.
Another method that is currently enjoying some popularity is the
use of advisory panels composed of both scientists and laymen. The
idea here is that the presence of the scientists insures scientific objectivity in the decisionmaking process, while the presence of the laymen (who may or may not form the majority) prevents scientific
elitism, that is, resolution of the social issues as well as the scientific
issues by scientists. The lay members are seen also as providing
the wisdom of the community on the social policy questions.
The frequently used mixed-advisory panel is probably the most
attractive competitor to the idea of the science court, but it has significant disadvantages not shared by the various science court proposals. First, even if the lay votes outnumber the scientists' votes
on an advisory panel, the scientists are nonetheless given votes on
the policy matters involved almost unavoidably well out of proportion
to their percentage of the population. Thus, the advisory panel
merely diminishes one of the evils that is apparently eliminated by
the science court proposal.
Second, a serious problem with giving scientists membership on
a deliberating panel would be that the nonexpert members might
give undue weight to the scientists' policy opinions. The members
of the panel would not be equal-the lay members would be
equipped with common sense and a moral consciousness, while the
scientific members would presumably have both those qualities plus
a critical expertise in factual matters. Under such circumstances it
is possible for the panel to avoid giving undue weight to the policy
opinions of the scientists, but it is sufficiently uncertain to make the
mixed panel's independence questionable.
13. Id. at 34-35.
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Third, and probably most serious, if one compares the advisory
panel to the science court proposal and notes that both ideas involve
the assistance of scientists in reaching policy decisions, it is clear
that the chief difference between the two concepts is that the scientists participate in the policy deliberations in the advisory-panel
model but not in the science court model. What may be said of
actual participation by scientists in deliberations? A comparison to
the use of expert testimony in front of juries is useful. There, of
course, the experts do not participate in decisionmaking. Were
they to do so, some of the function of the jury would be usurped,
but the jury would have the benefit of accurate scientific information
(or other kinds of information provided by the experts) at every
stage of its deliberations, and the jury would have a check against
misunderstanding of the expert testimony it has heard. Yet what
if the experts disagreed in the jury room? The lay members would
have to fill the roles of the science court judges in sorting out these
disagreements before being able to use the scientific information
from the experts. Moreover, the potential bias of the experts, which
is put to affirmative use in the science court model, would be under
no careful control in the jury room.
Probably the most telling objection to the advisory panel,
however, is not the way in which it arrives at scientific conclusions
but rather is the fact that it does arrive at policy decisions or recommendations. Use of the advisory panel means obtaining advice from
those who have not been elected or appointed to make policy. Thus,
as a matter of necessity, the panel's advice cannot be binding, but
rather can be only persuasive. It is still necessary to deliver both
scientific advice and policy advice to the final policymakers. If, as
the science court backers claim, the scientific issues can be separated
from the policy issues, there is no need to mix the two, nor is there
any need to filter the scientific component of the advice through the
votes of nonscientists. If the policy input that an advisory panel
might provide is thought desirable, it may be brought in separately,
as through amicus briefs in the courts.
Despite the objec.tions made above, a case can be made for the
use of advisory panels in some settings--chiefly the context of a
small unit, such as a city or a university, in which the policymakers
may have too many other commitments to be able to devote enough
time to achieving a mastery of the kind of information that a small
science court could provide. City council members, for example, are
often unpaid, part-time politicians with a livelihood to pursue. In
such cases, the objections stated above may be overborne by simple
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need, though even here, if the issue is important enough (such as
the issue in Cambridge, Massachusetts, of whether and how to regulate recombinant DNA research at Harvard University), the excuse
of lack of time becomes less convincing. · Certainly if the decision
in question is at a national level and is of a magnitude similar to some
issues discussed earlier (banning freon production, deciding priorities for the funding of energy research, etc.), the objections to the
advisory-panel approach stated above are not countered by similar
considerations.

JV.

SPECIFICS OF THE SCIENCE COURT PROPOSAL

A.

Who Would Use a Science Court?

The best case for a science court can be made when it is invoked
by Congress or the Executive for assistance in the determination of
global policy issues. The science court proposals, if viewed as sets
of procedures rather than as an institution, might very well assist various administrative agencies in finding methods to resolve issues
within their administrative jurisdiction. However, although its significance as a set of procedures is noteworthy, greater attention here
will be paid to an institutionalized science court that could serve
·presidential and congressional needs.
It should be noted that the Executive is less likely to make use
of a science court than are administrative agencies or the Congress,
since the President already has a science adviser and will often have
a political stake in a decision of a science court that could be undermined if the decision were adverse to the Executive's interest. Congress, on the other hand, is not monolithic, and if, as proposed
below, minorities in Congress are allowed to present issues to the
science court, political factors are likely to encourage rather than discourage submission of such issues from Congress. Also suggested
below is a system of intervention by Congress when issues are
submitted by the President, and vice versa, based on the notion that
once Congress has submitted an issue, allowing intervention would
minimize the danger that either the President or Congress could
manipulate results by presenting a set of one-sided questions to a
science court.
B.

Who Will Select the Issues?

One of the original purposes of the science court proposal is to
separate the scientific questions from the policy or political issues in
problems involving science. Consistent with that goal it ought to be
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reasonably clear that the selection of the issues that a science court
would consider is itself a political function. If Congress does not
want to know what the effects of the SST may be on the upper atmosphere, there is little need for advice on the subject from a
science court. The selection of the such issues must come from
the body that needs to know their answer:s. This may severely limit
the utility of the science court. If a public issue touching on a scientific question involves attacks on some established practice, such as
the production of freon, there may be little incentive for the "establishment" and its friends in Congress to invoke the assistance of a
science court, for that interest could only lose. Other issues, such
as which energy source should receive research funding, may not
involve questions in which one side or another is the "established"
interest.
The existence of a possible institutional bias against submission
of a particular issue to a science court does not, of course, eliminate
the utility of the court. First, as noted above, many public questions
will not involve entrenched positions which can only lose by answers
to scientific questions. Second, although there may be institutional
resistance to submission of questions in certain cases, the resistance
is by no means insured of success. On important issues there will
be pressure to get answers to the underlying scientific questions and
there may be embarrassment to those resisting such a course. It is, of
course, obvious that it would take a majority of close-minded policymakers on the "establishment" side of the issue, standing against the
votes of those with fixed opinions on the opposite side plus the votes
of those with open minds, simply to defeat the submission of an issue.
A device for submitting issues that might preserve some of the
benefits of a science court when Congress is the policymaker would
be to allow a minority of defined size (such as one-third) to submit
an issue. The size of the minority should be large enough to make
it likely that significant interest exists in ~swers to the questions submitted. If there remain issues that should be submitted to a science
court but for political reasons are not, it does not follow that the
science court idea has failed. On these issues that are not submitted,
we will have to "muddle through" with our current procedures, but
at least we will not have fallen behind our present position.
A problem similar to that of choosing the general issues for consideration by the science court will be insuring that issues are not
submitted in such a way as to distort the court's contribution. To
take an extreme example, if the issue of the safety of nuclear reactors between now and the year 2000 were submitted to a science
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court without submission of the issue of the safety of alternative
energy sources, a distorted picture could emerge, even though the
scientific questions were answered quite accurately. The stamp of
a science court, intended to isolate scientific issues to allow for informed and democratic policymaking, might have the opposite result. Unlike the problem discussed above of congressional majorities blocking issue submission, the harm from such issue distortion
could be affirmative-not merely having the effect of preserving the
status quo.
Fortunately, however, the solution to the two problems is the
same: allow congressional minorities to submit questions that round
out the issues submitted by the majority or by other minorities. A
congressional technical staff, such as the Office of Technological
Assessment, could assist in the specific framing of the issues involved
for greater protection against issue distortion.
Unfortunately, no similar, obvious device exists when the entity
referring issues to the science court is the executive branch of the
government. There might be a great temptation on the part of a
particular administration to "load the dice" by submitting carefully
tailored issues--designed carefully enough so that the one-sidedness
would not be blatant but might affect the political impact. The
structure of the Executive is such that minority views within it are
not likely to surface the way they do in Congress, and thus no internal, general "watchdog" exists to check any bias of the administration.
Here a strong argument emerges for an institutionalized, rather
than ad hoc, science court, since a single institution available to
Congress and the executive could allow intervention (borrowing
further from the courts) by congressional minorities (or a congressional majority) when it is felt that the Executive has submitted
distorted issues. Such a course would be difficult if the President
were free to convene his or her own science court panel not made
available to Congress. And, of course, it would be especially
troublesome to have two ( or more) science courts considering factual
questions involved in the same overall issue, especially if they
were to produce inconsistent results or at least were to give inconsistent impressions by answering somewhat different but related questions. Similarly, the Executive should be able to intervene when
issues are submitted by Congress.
Intervention might also be allowed when an administrative
agency makes use of a science court to determine some factual
matters related to a policy issue. Almost inevitably there will be
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interested parties ready to suggest supplemental questions designed
to avoid issue distortion. At some point, however, as one moves
down the scale from the "big issues" like energy policy to the small
issues, the danger arises that the cost of intervention may be too
great: questions of marginal significance to a policy issue may be
too expensive to pursue. Here, however, the commitment of some
small amount of policymaking function to a science court might be
useful: the judges, given a priori time and budget restraints, could
probably safely be counted on to make rational decisions as to how
relevant and important for avoiding issue distortion are the issues submitted by intervention.
C.

Funding for Science Courts

As pointed out by the Task Force of the Presidential Advisory
Group on Anticipated Advances in Science and Technology, 14 appointed to appraise the science court proposal, there may be some
danger that a science court used and funded by an administrative
agency would feel pressure to produce "acceptable" results. 10 Thus,
some form of independent funding may be desirable. The Task
Force's Interim Report, dealing only with initial experiments, has
suggested funding from the National Science Foundation to avoid the
problem. Since the NSF is an unlikely source of permanent funding,
another monetary resource must be found. For a science court serving Congress and the Executive, ordinary congressional funding
ought to be sufficient. For science courts serving the administrative
agencies, a separate budget item and a separate budgeting advocate
is probably advisable.
The more troublesome side of the issue is the funding of the
advocates. It is simply a fact of life that much more money will usually be available to one side than another if the dispute pits an environmental group against an industry, antiwar advocates against
armament industries, and the like. The Task Force's Interim Report
is somewhat unclear on whether or not there should be public funding of the advocates (as opposed to the court, which clearly merits
such funding). At present the advocates probably should not be
publicly funded. Inequality of funding has traditionally existed in
the lobbying efforts on various public questions without much attempt at adjustment by public funding. True, the stakes may be
14. See The Science Court Experiment: An Interim Report, 193
(1976) (hereinafter cited as Interim Report).
15. Id. at 654.
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higher here, but presentations before a science court would allow
a concentration of economic effort and much free publicity to the
more poorly funded advocate. Thus, some of the financial inequalities may actually be neutralized. Since "big" issues are likely to attract at least some funding, the problem is unlikely to be acute.
What is needed is reflection on this issue after some experience with
the use of a science court. Insights might be gained from making
comparisons to the problems of awarding attorneys' fees in publicinterest litigation.
"Small issue" hearings present a different problem. It may tum
out, for example, that small-issue hearings must be funded simply
because no group is sufficiently economically interested in the issues
at hand to present an adequate position. That might be the case
with drug safety hearings-there may not be any lobby economically
powerful enough to oppose a given drug manufacturer. This problem also suggests another difficulty, to be discussed below: what to
do if advocates can't be found for a given side.
D.

Selection of the Advocates

In many ways, the selection of the advocates is the most difficult
task in designing the science court--even more difficult than the selection of judges, discussed below. In a law suit, plaintiffs choose
both themselves and the defendants as parties. Intervention is a
rather rare event. Plaintiffs become such because they think they
have something to gain from the litigation. In all but a few cases
(such as class actions and so-called public interest cases) plaintiffs
represent only their own interests. Defendants are chosen by plaintiffs because defendants have or can do something plaintiffs want.
(Again, in a small number of cases, for example those challenging
the constitutionality of a law, choosing the right defendant may be
more of a problem.) The analogy between the law courts and the
proposed science court breaks down badly here, however, since in
the latter, in most cases, advocates on at least one side of an issue
would be representing interests much wider than those of a single
person or company. How, then, can advocates be chosen so that
they will be representative, capable, and vigorous?
The problem can be diminished somewhat when there is a
natural adversary in a given controversy-for example, companies
producing or intending to produce freon would be the obvious candidates to choose the advocates on one side of the freon issue. But
what about the other side? Who should represent the atmosphere?
The Task Force has suggested an idea that may prove workable in
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many (but not all) contexts. Under the proposal, chief adversaries
or "case managers" would be appointed by the science court or the
"collaborating agency"-the agency seeking the scientific advice.
Both selection processes may cause difficulties. If the collaborating
agency is seen as biased, its selection of case managers may be suspect. If the science court selects the case managers, it has involved
itself closely with the adversaries. A neutral institution, such as the
National Science Foundation, may be a preferable agency for choosing case managers. Whatever the choosing agency, the selection
would be accomplished after "requests for proposals" for case
managers (already dubbed "RFPs") had been issued. The Task
Force states that
Each submitted proposal should exhibit that the bidder has the
expertise and constituency to speak for one side of the issue and
name its case manager. For example, a group such as the Union of
Concerned Scientists, the Sierra Club, or Friends of the Earth might
be a reasonable bidder to represent the antinuclear side of that issue.
It might form an alliance with a scientific institution such as a nonprofit analysis group, with individual consultants, or both. In any
case, the objective is to exhibit that the bidder can provide the best
case for its side of the issue. Combinations of groups opposing
nuclear energy would be encouraged, and the RFP would point out
that such coalitions would be favored to receive the contract . . . .
The scientific credentials and constituency of the proposers will
be examined carefully by the Science Court, the collaborating agency,
or both, and a selection will be made by processes similar to those
used in selecting contractors for other purposes. 16

Nothing in the Task Force's proposal inherently limits it to issues involving only two sides, and one can well imagine disputes-such as
a debate over the source of energy whose development ought to be
most heavily funded in the next twenty years-in which three or
more sides, each with a case manager, might participate.
The Interim Report of the Task Force leaves unanswered what
is to be done when there is no natural adversary, such as in the case
of drug testing. The problem is not merely one of selecting advocates,
but rather also involves the workability of the whole factfinding concept itself, since the central purpose of the proposal is to borrow the
adversary process from the legal model on the assumption that the
truth would emerge after an encounter between disputing parties.
An approach that may be worth trying when natural adversaries
are lacking is what might be called the "canonization model," making use of a devil's advocate. Any agency, such as the FDA, whose
16. Id.
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task it is to make determinations about a specific product as to which
there is no organized opposition, might seek out a competent "hired
gun" as ·an advocate-a kind of lawyer without a client. The weakness in such an approach is that there is little incentive to keep the
devil's advocate advocating devilishly. A lazy or complacent devil's
advocate will do little good but will help create the false appearance
of a useful proceeding.
In favor of the science court proposal, even when a devil's advocate is necessary, it might be noted that public prosecutors bear some
similarities to the devil's advocate. Prosecutors theoretically "win"
either way the case comes out-but that fact has not generally
prevented them from gaining an emotional attachment (and thus
some adversarial zeal) to "winning" in the more common
sense. However, since prosecutors get to choose the cases they
pursue, it is much easier for them to believe that the defendant is
guilty whenever prosecuted-making emotional involvement all the
easier. A devil's advocate against the efficacy or safety of a randomly chosen drug, on the other hand, would have no such readymade moral crutch.
A second argument in favor of the science court approach, even
with the devil's advocate, is that a supposedly adversarial process
with an ineffective advocate on the "anti" side may still be more effective in finding the truth than the ordinary inquisitorial process it
would displace. This conclusion is sufficiently doubtful, however, to
make it clear that a science court approach will require particular
scrutiny when the devil's advocate must be used. Fortunately, by the
nature of things, such situations are likely to arise only on issues that
are not important enough to have generated much public controversy. For the "big" issues, the Interim Report's method of choosing
adversaries seems reasonably likely to be successful.
1

E.

Selection of the Judges

The Task Force's Interim Report says:
It is currently envisioned that the Science Court with consultation
from appropriate scientific societies and organizations will produce
a list of prospective judges certified as unusually capable scientists
having no obvious connections to the disputed issue. These will
then be examined by the case managers for prejudice. After acceptance, a panel of judges, say, three for the first experiment, will be
formed. 17
17. Id.
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The Interim Report makes no mention of the idea that judges be
drawn from an allied field so that, while they cannot be personally
interested, they are readily educable as to the issues. At the experimental stage it might be interesting to see whether biologists, for example, couJd function well in the context of a dispute involving
physics. Even if that proves possible, however, it would seem likely
that time and effort could be saved by choosing judges whose training allowed readier understanding of a given set of arguments.
Moreover, the opinions of such judges would probably command
more respect than would those of judges with less expertise.
A possible alternative to the selection of unbiased judges would
be the selection of a panel containing representatives of various viewpoints. Rather obviously the judges should not have taken sides on
the issues being presented, but it might be possible to select representatives of various general political persuasions-conservative,
moderate, liberal, radical, and the like. Although there are obvious
pitfalls with such an approach, it might be tempting to use it in the
effort to achieve wide popular acceptance of science court opinions.
In homespun terms, officials might fear that Ralph Nader would not
accept the opinion of a panel of Edward Tellers on any issue,
whether or not it had to do with nuclear energy.
Although philosophical balance on the panel is desirable, it
should not be pursued by attempting to weigh various extremes
against each other. The virtue of the science court proposal is that
it harnesses bias and self-interest through the use of advocates, while
judges remain as impartial as possible in considering scientific questions. In all but a very few cases18 the political motivations of a
science court judge could not legitimately affect the answers to scientific questions. Thus, injecting political considerations would invite
trouble. If some people are left unsatisfied by such an approach and
the science court's opinion on a question does not achieve universal
acceptance, so be it. It is still open to all to point out weaknesses
in the science court's reasoning, and it is still open to the policymakers-the ones who are to use the science court's opinion-to
assess its work product in light of the criticism.
18. It is possible that a science court judge of a particular political persuasion
could be motivated by political views to probe certain arguments more vigorously
than would others more politically neutral, and in the process tum up faults in the
analysis that even the politically neutral would agree were weaknesses. The incidence of such a happening should be minimized by the use of adequate advocates,
however, since the science court judge described above would really be performing
the function of an advocate.
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"Balancing" may be wise in another sense: having a mixture of
disciplines represented among the judges. The freon issue, for example, involves problems of chemistry, meteorology, and medicine.
In some cases in which the scientific controversies can be adequately
separated, different panels might consider different sub-issues involved in one major issue.
It seems unlikely that there would be any particular difficulty in
following the Interim Report's general procedure for selection of
judges. Initially there will probably be enough interest in the idea
to lead capable people to the job, and eventually enough prestige will
attach to these positions to assure widespread willingness to serve.
It is also unlikely that parties will veto prospective judges in order
to obstruct the truth-seeking process; since public relations will be
involved, neither side will wish to appear the obstructionist.
The size of the panel may be an interesting subject for experimentation. In particular, some hypotheses may be made, after using
panels of three and five, as to how important the size of the panel
is for understanding the issues, agreeing on how to resolve them,
and producing reasonably speedy results. Panel size may also affect
the legitimacy of the panel's opinion, with a greater number of judges
producing greater acceptance of the decision.
The Interim Report made a distinction between the judges of
a science court and what it referred to as a "referee." The exact
nature of the referee's function is not detailed: "In addition to the
panel of judges, there should be a referee, selected by the Science
Court, who is concerned with the implementation of agreed procedures in a scientific setting. For discussion we propose that the
referee should be a scientist advised by legal counsel, so that full
responsibility for this procedure can be retained by the scientific
community." 10 It appears that the referee would fulfill the role of
the judge in making procedural rulings, but the nature of the procedural disputes the referee would settle is not specified. The Interim
Report also indicates that the referee might be one of the judges
-a chief judge.
It is not clear that the function of ruling on procedural matters
would have to be separated from the judges' factfinding function,
or that it would have to be concentrated in one person. In other
words, there is no obvious reason for preventing all of the judges
from considering procedural matters, just as they all will consider
sut;,stantive matters. The Interim Report's suggestion that a lawyer
19. Interim Report, supra note 14, at 654.
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be made available for advice on procedural matters is probably a
good one, and the suggestion that referees (if they are not judges
or chief judges) not be lawyers is undoubtedly wise. Lawyers have
a certain amount of expertise in factfinding procedures, but that expertise deals with a procedure only somewhat analogous to that of
the science court, and there is consequently no compelling reason
to take control of the proceedings away from the scientist-judges.

F.
1.

The Proceedings

Formalizing the Issues

For a number of reasons, the issues submitted to a science court
must be policy issues. It is not reasonable to assume, for example,
that policymakers will necessarily be able to identify 411 of the relevant scientific questions. Thus, the issues submitted to the science
court must be reduced to questions of scientific fact.
One of the chief criticisms that has been leveled at the science
court proposal is that it is not always possible to separate issues of
scientific fact from issues of policy. AB yet, however, it does not
appear that the adherents of such a claim have produced either a
particular instance of inseparable questions or some pervasive reasoning that indicates that such questions exist. The most persuasive
argument here may be by analogy to the mixed questions of fact and
law that arise in the legal system-for example, a jury issue of
whether a particular civil defendant's conduct was negligent. But
even the negligence question involves physical facts that are distinguishable from the assessment of whether or not the facts constitute negligence. Apart from such analogies, there seems little reason
to believe that factual issues cannot be distilled from a debate over
public policy. 20
The Task Force's Interim Report contemplates that the process
of reducing issues to questions of fact will begin with each side making an allegation of facts free from value judgments-specifically, "they must be results or anticipated results of experiments
20. See, e.g., a letter to ScIENCE from Leon Lipson of the Yale Law School, in
which the author notes that the success of a science court "rests upon a distinctionrendered no more persuasive by frequent repetition-between facts and values." 194
ScIENCE 890 (1976). As noted in the text, however, so far no one seems to have
produced issues in which facts and values are inseparable. This matter appears to
be one of those issues in which the burden of proof should be placed on those asserting that a problem exists, rather than on those suggesting the opposite, since the for•
mer have to produce only one example to make their point, while the latter would
have to review an infinite number of possibilities to prove their assertion.
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or observations of nature." 21 This requirement does not insure,
however, that the statements will be provable or disprovable in
any absolute sense. For example, a statement would satisfy this
criterion if it asserted that the probability is one in one billion that
cancerous tumors will develop in humans who ingest a fixed amount
of a certain substance. But how would one conclusively prove such
a statement? This requirement at least does assure that nonfactual
questions, such as the acceptability of a certain risk, will not be injected into the scientific issues.
After a party submits its list of assertions and they have been
examined by the court to determine whether they contain only
assertions of fact, they will be accepted or challenged by the
opposition. Thus, in the manner of requests for admissions, this procedure will determine the questions in dispute. One innovation here
is the Interim Report's suggestion that there be "mediation" by
unspecified persons to determine whether disagreements on various
issues could be eliminated.
2.

Discovery

The Interim Report discusses but takes no stand on the sensitive
issue of discovery. This problem, while admittedly vexing in the
legal system, is made even more difficult in the context of a science
court by the dilemma of choosing appropriate sanctions for noncompliance. In the legal system, a wide range of sanctions is generally
available, graduating from minor sanctions to extreme measures such
as treating individual issues, or even the merits of the case, as settled
against the recalcitrant party. 22 Such sanctions would rather clearly
be inappropriate for a science court. For example, the United States
should not be committed to a specific energy policy because of one
party's misconduct, rather than as a consequence of an assessment
of the facts. The legal system can afford such results because the
disputes it handles are between litigants who must bear responsibility
for their acts. No such principle controls where the advocates represent positions affecting us all.
On the whole, discovery seems to promise more trouble than it
would be worth. Since the nature of the facts to be determined by
a science court is scientific, and therefore general rather than specific
(e.g., did defendant go through a red light on a specific occasion?),
the need for discovery diminishes. Some discoverable items might
21. Id.
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2).
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be valuable, such as the results of specific tests that are expensive
to conduct (and thus costly for the other side to repeat) or are
time consuming ( and thus not possible to repeat within the time constraints of a science court). But the likelihood is slight that test results known to be in existence will be withheld, since, with or without
specific sanctions, most parties will recognize that such nondisclosure
will probably lead to results unfavorable to them.
The real problem in designing discovery procedures for a science
court is how to deal with tests conducted by one side that do not
become known to the other. Even in such cases, however, the potential for harm resulting from not permitting discovery can be reduced. An ethic among individual scientists allowing for the production of such information without sanctions can be established. Since
it is generally unlikely to have expensive or time-consuming tests that
involve only a small number of people, the probability that the material would be divulged by at least one person would be high.
The costs of allowing discovery seem to outweigh the ill effects
of not permitting it, even though it must be recognized that an ethic
of disclosure will not eliminate the possibility of concealment of important facts. With the unavailability of sanctions going to the
merits, 23 the search for effective sanctions is difficult. And battles
over discovery might divert the attention of the litigants and the court
away from the central issues. Moreover, the prestige, and thus
utility, of the science court could be diminished greatly if a proceeding were to degenerate into what might be viewed as legal wrangling.
Until evidence appears to the contrary, it seems safe to assume that
the political dangers of being discovered withholding important information are adequate incentives to be sufficiently honest. 24
One type of discovery-that which is designed to uncover early
information about evidence that an opponent intends to produceis clearly easier to deal with than discovery aimed at material that
an opponent might be trying to conceal. There will be much less
resistance to discovery of evidence to be presented, and sanctions,
such as delaying the proceedings in order to allow the side refused
discovery to digest new evidence that should have been produced
by discovery, would probably prove effective without seriously inter23. See text at note 22 supra.
24: Discovery might prove to be practical for "small-issue hearings" in a science
court. FDA drug proceedings are an obvious example. The difference between such
proceedings and the "big proceedings" discussed in the text lies in the degree to which
one side or the other is already regulated and subject to discovery by alternative
methods.
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fering with the accuracy of the conclusions reached by the science
court.
Rejecting discovery, of course, does not imply that the science
court should reject all traditional legal controls on accuracy. In particular, it might be wise to retain the sanction of perjury for deliberate misstatements of fact.
3.

Presentation of Evidence

The Interim Report notes that traditional legal rules of evidence
would not be controlling before the science court. A specific
example is the need to qualify an expert witness, "since his statements will be open to detailed challenge. " 25 Other requirements,
like relevance, would ·be retained. "Traditional" scientific rules of
evidence would be followed without prior specification since, as the
Task Force indicates, they have not been written down anywhere
in coherent form. Presumably these rules include such matters as
proper statistical inference, reliance on double-blind tests in cases
of medication, and the like.
An interesting question here is whether evidence should be
presented in written or oral form. The Task Force notes advantages
on both sides. 26 The avoidance of dramatic surprise (eliminated in
part in the legal system by discovery) and of wrangling over evidentiary matters, and the tradition of the scientific community in relying
on written communication, favor the use of written evidence.
Factors favoring the use of oral evidence are speed in presentation
and the increased credibility resulting from greater opportunity for
public scrutiny of the science court's proceedings.
This area is one in which procedural flexibility should be retained. Presentation of complex matters, including calculations, may
be virtually useless if given in purely oral form. On the other hand,
cross-examination and focusing on particular points are greatly facilitated by oral presentations. It is doubtful that precise evidentiary
rules can be designed beforehand, or that the proper mix of such
rules for one hearing would be the proper mix for another. This
area seems appropriate for ad hoc agreements among the adversaries
and the court, with the court ruling in the case of continuing dispute.
4.

The Opinion of the Science Court

The most crucial stage of the proceedings may be the opinion
25. Interim Report, supra note 14, at 655.
26. Id.
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of the science court. It is here that the most safeguards can be taken
against the legitimate doubts and fears of those who oppose or are
not convinced of the virtues of a science court. The Interim Report
shows a good degree of sensitivity to these concerns in its very brief
discussion of this issue. It indicates that the opinion should consist
primarily of two series of factual statements: the first, those agreed
on by the adversaries, and the second, those determined by the
science court. The statements of fact, of course, can be cumulative
-that is, statement 10 may indicate that if statements 4 and 5
are true, then something else is also true.
Critical to the integrity of the process is the Interim Report's suggestion that "some or most of these statements of fact will be qualified with statements about probable validity or margins of error."27
Thus, the Interim Report points out, ignorance as well as knowledge
will be delineated. A beneficial side effect of indicating areas of
ignorance will be the indication of where new research might be appropriate. And, as the Interim Report emphasizes, the opinion must
not contain any statements of policy-only of fact.
The Interim Report fails to deal with several questions involving
the opinion of the science court, however. One possibly useful procedure would be to impose a format for the opinion requiring the
recitation, in substance, of the tentative nature of all conclusions on
scientific issues that would emphasize that the opinion deals only
with probabilities. Such a recitation should be at the head of the
opinion and should not be in standardized form. In fact, by avoiding
standardization (but, one hopes, retaining brevity), the rhetorical
tendencies of the opinion writer might be satisfied, which might help
keep the recitation from becoming a piece of boilerplate ignored by
the press and other observers. The function of the recitation, of
course, is to serve as a constant reminder that the science court is
not the Supreme Court of Science, 28 making final determinations of
truth. Any opportunity to make that point, and thus lessen the currency of that belief, should be used.
Another point not raised by the Interim Report, but which was
suggested by its reference to spotlighting areas needing additional
research, is whether the court should ask the adversaries to perform
specific experiments or studies before the final opinion is rendered.
Obviously such requests should be made with discretion, since they
create a significant danger of excessive cost and delay. But some
27. Id.
28. This phrase is attributed to Alan McGowan, President of the Scientists' Institute for Public Information, in Boffey, supra note 1.
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issues might be resolved, for example, by further analysis of existing
data. Thus, even after the ordinary presentation of evidence has
ended and judicial deliberations have begun, some dialogue between
the science court and the adversaries may be advisable, similar to
a law court's request that counsel brief an issue.
A third point that is not dealt with by the Interim Report is
dissenting opinions in the science court. It is almost inevitable that
they will be allowed, since the legitimacy of an opinion could not
long be artificially sustained in the face of reports of dissension
within the court. On' the other hand, the destructive effect of dissenting opinions might be substantially reduced (as might the
tendency to dissent in the first place) if certain procedural requirements are imposed. Dissenters could be required to name specific
statements in the findings of the majority with which they disagree
and to state explicitly what the grounds for disagreement are.
Second, the majority could be required to answer the dissent point
by point. It is hard to believe that any dissents would survive this
requirement (the majority having capitulated or the potential dissenter having had a change of mind) unless the disagreement is one
that expresses an underlying uncertainty-which the majority
opinion itself ought to proclaim. In any event, the requirements of
direct response to contrary assertions (which is much like the adversarial duty imposed on the parties) would be educational, and
readers of science court opinions would be spared the frustration that
lawyers suffer when the majority and dissenting opinions of law
courts are unresponsive to each other.
A final matter of great importance treated only sketchily by the
Interim Report is the finality to be granted to the science court's
opinion. It is tempting to say that there should be no such finalitythat science marches on. But the context in which the opinion is
sought-the need to make policy decisions-means that some
degree of finality must exist. Also, limitations on time and money
dictate that not every new datum lead to reinspection of a wellconsidered opinion.
Two mechanisms ought to be available for reconsideration of a
science court opinion. First, reconsideration should be allowed if
sought by the governmental instrumentality that originally requested
the science court's opinion. If, after a year of further research, Congress wants a second opinion on the safety of nuclear reactors, why
not provide it? In some cases the requesting agency might wish to
have the decision reviewed on a periodic basis. Second, there
should be some opportunity for the adversaries to initiate calls for
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reconsideration in light of new data. Practicality should be the key
here-not the intricacies of such rules as rule 60(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Considerations of whether or not to reopen an issue in response to an adversary's request ought to be as
follows:
(1) are the new data significant enough to make the expense
of reconsideration worthwhile?
(2) has the policy decision already been made on the basis of
the original opinion, and, if so, is it practical to change it if the opinion of the court should change?
(3) is the overall issue important enough, even assuming that
no irrevocable commitments have been made and that the science
court's opinion might be changed, to undergo the costs of reconsideration?
Obviously there are policy and scientific questions present in
these considerations, and one of the goals of promoters of the science
court idea has been the avoidance of policy determinations by a
science court. An approach reasonably accommodating all interests
might be to allow the parties to move reconsideration to the court
by submitting a concise statement of reasons for it. The court could
then make some preliminary estimate-a guess, really-as to the
probability that its original opinion would be affected by the new
data. If that probability seemed small enough, the matter could stop
there, with the science court rejecting the request. If the probability
seemed great enough, the science court could formally propose to
go ahead with a reinquiry. Such reconsideration could proceed subject to a veto power of the agency that originally requested the
opinion, but once more the rules could be adjusted to make a veto
as difficult to use as necessary, so that politics could not squelch a
truly likely change of result, while potential changes of position by
the science court that have been rendered irrelevant by external
events (such as commitment of funds, or abandonment of a project
for other than scientific reasons) need not be pursued.
V.

THE POTENTIAL DANGERS OF A SCIENCE COURT

The most pointed opposition to the science court proposal has
come from those who think not that it will be ineffective, but rather
that it will be too effective in making its judgments on scientific
matters conclusive. One critic has dubbed the proposed science
court "the Supreme Court of Science." 29 In support of such fears,
29. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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critics have reminded us of the medieval Church's censorship of
Galileo or of Lysenko's more recent death-grip on Soviet research in
the biological sciences. In their more extreme forms, these fears
seem quite clearly unfounded. The purposes of the proposed
science court is not to settle scientific truth, but rather to give provisional answers to questions that, for some purposes, need immediate
answers. As indicated earlier, it would seem to be a good idea to
begin each opinion with a paragraph reminding the reader of
the purpose served by the court. But beyond that point, special
efforts to avoid dogmatism seem superfluous-the pace of scientific
discovery in recent years has given both scientists and the public a
healthy skepticism for "final" answers to scientific questions.
A more realistic fear is that public funding of research in particular scientific areas may be curtailed by determinations of a
science court on those matters. If a science court tells Congress,
for example, that hydrogen fusion is unlikely to provide significant
percentages of U.S. power needs before the year 2000, Congress
may well curtail funds for fusion research. But informed policymaking, including budget decisions, is precisely the reason for the
proposed science court. Just as there is no infringement of the first
amendment when the Postal Service requires magazine publishers to
pay postage, there is no impermissible infringement of free scientific
inquiry when Congress uses practicality as a guide for terminating
funding of certain inquiries-no matter how disappointed those deprived of such funds may be.
Once this principle is accepted, the relevant question is this: does
the proposed science court somehow pose new or previously unimportant problems regarding the exercise of the pursemaster's discretion whether to fund scientific research? To the extent that the
science court assists in more rational decisionmaking, it clearly does
not pose any such problems. To the extent that a particular science
court opinion may live too long, however, it clearly does. In other
words, if a particular science court opinion becomes sanctified, it may
stifle funding long after new discoveries make its conclusions doubtful. The procedures for reconsideration discussed above, however,
should effectively minimize such dangers.
Reflection on these affirmative dangers of a science court leads
to the conclusion that they can be eliminated or effectively minimized. There remains, however, the difficult question whether a
science court might prove to be merely ineffective, and thus not
worthy of establishment even if the affirmative dangers can be safely
dealt with. The next section follows, in an abbreviated fashion,
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an imaginary case through a science court in order to set a basis
for consideration of this last and most difficult question.
VI.

A

"CASE HISTORY" OF A MATTER BEFORE
THE SCIENCE COURT

In order to make much of the discussion above more concrete,
what follows is an imagined history of a case submitted by Congress
to a s_cience court. I have chosen a question of current interest but
have embellished freely on the political situation in order to illustrate
various aspects of the operations of a science court.
Imagine that Congress is contemplating the modification of the
Delaney Amendment30 to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act. 31 The Delaney Amendment was added to section 348(c)
(3)(A) of the Act, which allows only "safe" food additives to be
used, and provides: "[N]o additive shall be deemed to be safe if
it is found to induce cancer when ingested by man or animal, or if
it is found, after tests which are appropriate for the evaluation of
the safety of food additives, to induce cancer in man or animal.
. . . ." The proposed modification would allow the continued sale
of saccharin, which we will assume has been banned by the FDA.
Under the proposals made above, Congress proposes a question
to the science court. The question is in very general form and contains a policy component: "Should the sale of saccharin be allowed
as it had been until mid-1977?" The President, concerned with the
vitality of the large saccharin industry and fearing that the answers
of the science court might discourage the relegalization of the
substance, intervenes to pose the further question, "If not, should
saccharin be made available on a more restrictive basis?" (Recall
that political backdrop is being fabricated to illustrate the use of the
science court proposal.)
Under established procedures, the matter is publicized, and
individuals and groups are invited to propose themselves as advocates for the competing sides. The National Science Foundation is
chosen to select the advocates. On the one side, the saccharin producers band together with an impressive team of scientists and
lawyers to present a united front. The American Medical Association and other groups, however, suggest that saccharin be made
available only to diabetics and to those certified by a doctor to be
overweight and in need of a sugar substitute. Ralph Nader and
numerous other public-interest lobbyists submit bids to represent the
side advocating a complete ban on saccharin.
30. 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1970).
31. 21 u.s.c. §§ 301-392 (1970).

April-May 1977]

Science Court

1087

Faced with these bids, the National Science Foundation
establishes three sides: pro-saccharin, limited saccharin, and antisaccharin. It selects the industry group to advocate for the first position ( the only candidate) and negotiates with the AMA and the other
limited-saccharin groups until they agree on a single advocate team.
No such agreement proves possible among the anti-saccharin groups,
and the National Science Foundation chooses the one it believes to
be best able to represent the anti-saccharin position. Several of the
groups complain about politics and imply that the NSF has deliberately chosen a group that will not present the most effective possible
case. Some of them later take advantage of the opportunity to
submit amicus briefs on various matters.
When the advocates have been selected, the NSF compiles a
large list of scientists who have worked in the area of human nutrition (and perhaps some who have done cancer research), none of
whom has any contact with the saccharin issue itself. The names
of everyone known to have taken strong public stands on closely related issues are deleted from the list. The anti-saccharin group complains that the process of eliminating the names of potential judges
who have taken public stands on related issues has automatically produced a bias toward conservatism and traditionalism on the panel,
but the NSF refuses to change the list, and a panel of three is selected by lot after a few names have been challenged successfully
for potential prejudice. One of the groups that sought to be advocate for the anti-saccharin position announces publicly that, because
of built-in bias against the choice of radical scientists as judges, the
panel is biased and consequently the group will consider the results
invalid.
The first task for the advocates is to propose a series of assertions, in the form of factual statements, for submission to the science
court. The pro-saccharin advocate submits (among many others)
the statements that "no deaths or cases of cancer in humans have been
reliably attributed to saccharin ingestion," "the consumption of sugar
dropped only three per cent despite the recent rapid price increase
of over 200 per cent" (suggesting great need or desire for sweeteners), and "in experiments with rats, animals allowed equal access
to sweeteners and to food die of malnutrition" (suggesting that mere
willpower is not enough to do without sweeteners). The limited-saccharin group submits similar statements but emphasizes that certain
groups, such as diabetics, have no adequate substitute for saccharin,
and that obesity is believed to cause far more deaths annually than

1088

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 75:1058

does cancer possibly resulting from saccharin ingestion. The antisaccharin group submits the original test results (and other subsequent tests) showing the causal connection between saccharin and
bladder tumors in mice; this group also submits statements of the
form "X number of people are likely to die of cancer each year if
saccharin continues to be sold."
The science court reviews the submitted statements; a few are
found to contain impermissible nonfactual elements and are rejected
as to form by the court. The parties revise those questions to confine them to factual assertions and then resubmit them. Many statements are agreed to by all the parties, and they are automatically
incorporated into the findings of the science court. The rest become
the subject of hearings.
By agreement among the parties, each side informs the others
in advance of the witnesses it intends to call and identifies the studies
upon which -it will rely. A summary of the witnesses' proposed testimony is exchanged before the day of testimony to allow adverse parties to prepare better for cross-examination. Some testimony is
accepted in written form, and some witnesses testify both orally and
in writing, with the latter concentrating on technical matters, especially calculations.
At the end of the testimony and submission of documents, the
science court panel begins its deliberations. It calls on the parties
a few times to ask further questions. The process of decision takes
two months, and a rather lengthy opinion is produced. It contains
a summary of the court's holding and findings on the specific statements submitted by the parties. Some statements are labeled as true
or false with a high degree of certainty; some are found to be irrelevant to the questions presented to the court; some are found to be
true or false with a limited degree of certainty. For example, the
court finds that a substance shown to produce cancer in mice is very
likely but not certain to produce cancer in humans. Consistent with
its mission to address only factual questions, the court does not answer the question whether the Delaney Amendment ought to be repealed or modified to allow the sale of saccharin.
With the answers from the science court, the debate in Congress
does not disappear. The answers provided by the science court have
indicated both that there is substantial risk of cancer associated with
the use of large amounts of saccharin and that it is probable that
large numbers of people will significantly increase sugar consumption
if saccharin becomes unavailable, probably leading to increased incidence of heart attacks and other health problems associated with
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overweight. But these findings do nothing to indicate whether Congress ought to take into account the potential for self-control-which
can reduce the risks associated with sugar if intake is limited but not
those associated with saccharin if it is used as a sugar substitute and
its intake is not limited. Nor has the opinion of the science court
offered any counsel on whether a given number of deaths due to
cancer may be worse for society than the same number of deaths
due to heart attacks, given the greater fear that cancer generates in
the public. These and other questions remain policy issues for Congress to resolve. Some are dissatisfied that submission of the issue
to the science court has not resolved all of these questions.
VII.

Is IT WORTH IT?

Unfortunately, judging the success or failure of a science court
may be no easy matter. Even the simple question of whether or
not a science court's answers to scientific questions are accurate will
be elusive. Assume, for example, in the saccharin case history of
the previous section, Congress had decided, after considering the
science court's opinion, to modify the Delaney Amendment in such
a way as to make saccharin as freely available as it traditionally has
been. It might be possible in the future to make guesses as to how
many cancer deaths (or sicknesses) had occurred as a result of this
decision, but it would not be possible to verify the science court's
answers to questions concerning how many deaths and disabilities
would have occurred due to increased sugar consumption if the ban
on saccharin had not been lifted. In other words, sometimes the
very conclusions of a science court will make verification of some
of its answers impossible.
A more subtle point in judging the work of a science court is
the fact that an erroneous conclusion of scientific fact by the court
does not necessarily mean failure of the concept of a science court.
A science court predicting future, unknown developments will obviously be wrong upon occasion. The real concern, however, should
be its overall record, not its predictions on individual points. After
all, the only way that one can give foolproof answers to all questions
concerning the results of future research is actually to do the research. If the question involves the results of research that would
consume the next twenty years, a perfectly accurate answer would
require twenty years of research, as well as all the money Congress
does not want to spend without some indication that it will be well
spent. Once more, however, a science court's ability to modify its
opinions when subsequent developments call for it should be a factor
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in evaluating the success of the court, even if initial absolute accuracy
is not required.
These concerns, however, are merely problems with the accuracy
of the answers to be supplied by a science court. The more complex
problem is their utility. Some policymakers, for example, do not
want merely factual information from the court, especially if that information is presented in the form of probabilities rather than certainties. Senator Muskie is said to have yearned for a "one-armed
scientist" who would not follow each assertion with the statement,
"[O]n the other hand . . . ."32 Similarly, there are policymakers
who undoubtedly want policy recommendations from their scientistadvisers. Despite the understandability of such desires, however, it
is precisely the function of our policymakers to make policy and to
deal with the real world realistically-which includes dealing with
uncertainties. Indeed, dealing with uncertainties that cannot be
further resolved is necessarily a policy function rather than the function of a factfinder. If the effect of a science court is to force policymakers to perform their proper roles, even when the task is not easy,
it will have had some success. 33
The question remains, however, whether the efforts needed to
create and use a science court are justified by the potential benefits
of the institution. Ironically, there is no scientific test for whether
a science court is successful, since the question is social rather than
scientific. Apart from a record of inaccurate opinions that would indicate failure, the science court idea would also be a failure if the accuracy of its opinions were high but they were left unused or were
misused. As a realistic matter, deciding whether or not an opinion
has been misused will not often be immediately possible. In the short
run, judging the success of a science court, like most political assessments, will have to rely mostly on intuitive judgments. By way of
32. The remark is reported in Hammond & Adelman, Science, Values, and Human Judgment, 194 ScIENCE 389, 390 (1976).
33. It can well be argued that there is some utility in concealing policy decisions
behind nonpolicy rationales, such as disputes over facts. For example, it is reasonably possible to calculate how many lives will be lost in the process of constructing a given bridge. If undue emphasis were placed on this loss of life (ignoring attempts to minimize risk, voluntary assumption of risk, benefits of the project, and
the like), perhaps no bridges would be built. Assuming that there are any cases
in which such concealment would be acceptable, they should obviously be few in
number in an intelligent society in which policymakers are to be held responsible
to the electorate. There seems no reason to believe that social problems involving
scientific or technological questions are more likely than others to justify such concealment of the truth. Thus, this objection is no stronger when applied against the
science court idea than against any other factfinding process we have as a resource
for policymaking.

April-May 1977]

Science Court

1091

analogy, the success or failure of the legal system is not based on the
correctness of the decisions it reaches, since there is no independent
way to judge correctness. Instead, the success of the legal system is
measured by the confidence people have that it reaches an acceptably high level of correct decisions (given its costs), and that in turn
is based on perceptions of the fairness of the proceedings, competence of the participants, and the like.
At this point one can only guess, of course, whether a science
court would contribute significantly to the intelligent resolution of
science-oriented policy questions, or whether it might become "just
another federal bureaucracy," in the words of recent political campaigns. It is hard to avoid a certain amount of optimism about the
utility of a science court that would be used in connection with
reasonably important public issues. Even small contributions to the
intelligent resolution of very important controversies are likely to be
worthwhile, so long as the danger is minimized (as it can be) that
the contribution would be negative. Thus, the likelihood is reasonably high that a science court would contribute more than it would
cost.
By similar reasoning the case for establishment of an experimental science court is almost compelling. Even if one doubts its likely
contribution, the potential for utility is great enough to justify an effort to try the concept and assess its performance.

